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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
In 1951, the Philadelphia City Council enacted a Home 
Rule Charter which, informed by Philadelphia’s history of 
political patronage, restricted certain political activities by 
city employees. In this appeal we must decide whether one 
such restriction, which prevents members of the Philadelphia 
Police Department from making contributions to their union’s 
political action committee, violates the First Amendment. We 
hold that it does. 
I 
A 
Appellant Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police 
(FOP) is an incorporated collective bargaining organization 
that represents the approximately 6,600 active police officers 
employed by the City of Philadelphia. FOP operates a 
political action committee, Appellant COPPAC, for the 
purpose of distributing contributions to candidates for local 
and state office. According to FOP’s leadership, COPPAC 
affords police officers an opportunity to speak on issues of 
concern with a “collective voice,” which include 
departmental interests in “better equipment, manpower, [and] 
livable conditions.” A132. COPPAC funds information 
campaigns that educate the public about issues important to 
the police, and contributes to political candidates who support 
the department’s positions on these issues. To date, COPPAC 
has donated to city, state, and judicial campaigns.  
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In this case, FOP, COPPAC, and four police officers 
(collectively, the FOP Plaintiffs)
1
 challenge the 
constitutionality of section 10-107(3) of the Philadelphia 
Home Rule Charter, which prohibits employees of the 
Philadelphia Police Department from making contributions 
“for any political purpose.”2 351 Pa. Code § 10.10-107(3). As 
interpreted by its implementing regulation, the Charter 
                                                 
1
 The individual officers are David Byrne, Shawn 
Carey, Jeffrey Seamon, and Les Baker. The FOP Plaintiffs 
sued the City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia Mayor Michael A. 
Nutter, the Philadelphia Board of Ethics (Ethics Board), and 
individual members of the Ethics Board (collectively, the 
City). The individual Ethics Board members are J. Shane 
Creamer, William H. Brown, Richard Glazer, Sanjuanita 
Gonzalez, Phyllis Beck, and Michael H. Reed. 
The Ethics Board was established in 2006 to 
“administer and enforce all provisions of [the] Charter and 
ordinances pertaining to ethical matters,” including 
“prohibited political activities.” Phila. Home Rule Charter § 
4-1100. It promulgates rules and regulations that interpret 
provisions of the Charter, and investigates and enforces 
violations of the Charter. See Phila. Code § 20-606(1)(a). 
2
 The provision provides in full: 
No officer or member of the Philadelphia Police 
or of the Fire Department shall pay or give any 
money or valuable thing or make any 
subscription or contribution, whether voluntary 
or involuntary, for any political purpose 
whatever.  
 5 
 
prohibits police officers from making donations “received by 
a candidate . . . for use in advocating or influencing the 
election of the candidate,” or providing donations “received 
by a political committee, political party, or partisan political 
group.” Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 8, § 8.1(f); see id. § 8.8.3 
Accordingly, employees of the Philadelphia Police 
Department cannot donate to COPPAC because it uses some 
of its funds for partisan political purposes. Notably, the 
Charter ban applies only to the police, and does not proscribe 
political donations made by Philadelphia’s other 20,000 
employees, the vast majority of whom are represented by 
organized interests.
4
 
COPPAC presently operates out of an account that 
contains approximately $25,000. FOP solicits funds for 
COPPAC by mail and hosts regular fundraisers, at which 
large donors receive so-called “courtesy cards” from the 
                                                 
3
 Regulation 8, which interprets section 10-107, 
reiterates the Charter’s prohibition on political contributions 
by the police, providing that no “appointed officer or 
employee of the Police Department . . . may make 
contributions intended for a political purpose.” Bd. of Ethics 
Reg. No. 8, § 8.8. 
4
 Of the city’s 27,000 employees, approximately 
20,000 are represented by four unions: FOP, Fire Fighters 
Local Union No. 22, and District Councils 33 and 47 of the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees. Each of the three unions that represent the 
balance of the city’s unionized employees has established 
political action committees that regularly contribute to 
candidates for political office.  
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union that extend “all courtesies of [the] organization” to the 
donor. A139. FOP also endorses candidates for local office 
and regularly holds fundraisers for them. The City is 
concerned that officers may have inadvertently violated the 
contribution ban during these fundraisers, but has indicated 
that it is willing to forego enforcement of past transgressions.
5
 
The FOP Plaintiffs maintain that COPPAC’s current 
funds cannot support the committee’s operational costs or 
effectively advance the union’s political agenda. They claim 
that COPPAC’s relatively meager account—which has 
prevented the committee from purchasing expensive 
television advertisements and from contributing to 
candidates’ campaigns—has placed the police at a 
competitive disadvantage, especially in labor negotiations 
where they compete with other municipal workers. As recent 
examples, the FOP Plaintiffs cite instances where FOP has 
failed to convince legislators to increase officers’ pensions, to 
prevent an interagency reorganization that reduced the police 
department’s workload, and to improve officers’ working 
conditions. 
                                                 
5
 In a May 5, 2011, letter to FOP, Appellee J. Shane 
Creamer, the Executive Director of the Ethics Board, 
suggested that FOP “remind members who are current Police 
Department employees that they cannot make political 
contributions,” lest they be “subject to penalties . . . which 
include a $300 fine and removal from office or immediate 
dismissal.” A98. Creamer indicated that the Ethics Board 
would not enforce violations if donors wrote to the candidate, 
with a copy to Creamer, requesting reimbursement of their 
contributions. The Ethics Board intends to enforce future 
violations of the Charter ban, however. 
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The contribution ban prevents COPPAC from 
accessing a potentially significant source of funds—FOP’s 
own members. On May 4, 2006, the Philadelphia City 
Council, under the administration of then-Mayor John F. 
Street, passed City Bill No. 060181, an ordinance that 
authorized payroll deductions for FOP members who elected 
to contribute to COPPAC. If the ordinance were 
implemented, COPPAC could receive funds that are 
automatically deducted from officers’ paychecks on a 
biweekly basis. COPPAC emphasizes that individual 
contributors would have no ability to direct who receives their 
donations because they are distributed at the discretion of 
FOP’s executive board, which chooses whom to fund. 
Although City Bill No. 060181 remains on the books, 
the current administration, under Mayor Michael A. Nutter, 
refuses to implement it as violative of the Charter ban. If the 
ban is lifted, FOP intends to distribute forms to all recruits on 
“the first day they would be in attendance” at the police 
academy, so they may authorize paycheck deductions to 
COPPAC. A135.  
B 
The Charter’s contribution ban is but one of many 
prohibitions that aim to insulate the police from political 
influence. In 2006, the Ethics Board issued Regulation 8, 
which interprets the political restrictions on city employees in 
the Charter. While only the police are subject to the 
contribution ban, see Bd. of Ethics Reg. No. 8, § 8.8, 
Regulation 8 bars all city employees from engaging in a wide 
range of political activities—defined as “activity directed 
toward the success or failure of a political party, candidate, or 
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partisan political group.” Id. § 8.1(n).6 The Ethics Board has 
construed Regulation 8 to forbid all city employees from 
engaging in political activity while on duty, in uniform, or 
using city resources; using their authority for any political 
purpose; serving on the national, state, or local committee of 
a political party; serving as an officer of a partisan political 
group; or taking part in the management or affairs of a 
political party, campaign, or partisan political group. See id. 
§§ 8.3–11. 
These restrictions mirror those in the Hatch Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), which prohibits federal employees from 
taking “an active part in political management or in political 
campaigns,” and has withstood multiple challenges to its 
constitutionality. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (Letter Carriers), 413 
U.S. 548, 566–67 (1973) (holding that Congress’s interest in 
maintaining an apolitical bureaucracy justified the Hatch 
Act’s restrictions on political activity); United Pub. Workers 
of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947) (same); 
see also Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) 
(holding, in a companion case to Letter Carriers, that States 
may enact Hatch Act-type restrictions on the political 
activities of their civil servants). The FOP Plaintiffs do not 
challenge these restrictions in this case. 
                                                 
6
 A “partisan political group” is defined, tautologically, 
as “[a]ny committee, club, or other organization that is 
affiliated with a political party or candidate or whose primary 
purpose is to engage in political activity.” Bd. of Ethics Reg. 
No. 8, § 8.1(l).  
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Regulation 8 does not preclude city employees from 
participating in all forms of political activity. The Ethics 
Board has read the regulation as permitting the right to 
register and vote in any election; to belong to a political party 
or partisan group, but not to the group’s political committee; 
and to engage in personal political expression “uncoordinated 
with a party, candidate, or partisan group.” See Bd. of Ethics 
Reg. No. 8, §§ 8.12–14.  
Most notably, subpart G of the regulation specifically 
exempts from restriction “expression and activity that is not 
political and not directed toward the success or failure of a 
political party, candidate or partisan political group.” Id. § 
8.17. Accordingly, city employees may publicly express their 
opinions on political matters or candidates; sign political 
petitions; and attend political rallies, conventions, fundraisers, 
and other political events, albeit only as spectators. Id. § 8.15. 
Pursuant to this carve-out, police officers may contribute time 
and money to nonpolitical organizations that promote causes 
they care about. As the District Court found, they may donate 
to groups such as the Sierra Club and the National Rifle 
Association. Moreover, Regulation 8 does not prohibit city 
employees from aggregating their voices in political groups, 
such as FOP, which may endorse and fund political 
candidates, and publicize the groups’ positions on legislative 
and executive matters.  
C 
One cannot understand the prohibitions in the 
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter without reference to its 
origins and Philadelphia’s efforts to combat patronage. In the 
century preceding the adoption of the 1951 Charter, 
Philadelphia’s civic government was dominated by political 
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party organizations. The city’s then-powerful Republican 
Party machine had a stranglehold on local government, 
determining who was elected, who was hired, and who 
received lucrative government contracts. Because it 
controlled every level of government, the machine built a 
“patronage army” of city employees, rewarding its own 
members and subordinates with paid office positions. Phila. 
Comm. of Seventy, The Charter: A History, at 1 (1980) 
(hereinafter Charter History). The machine’s reach was so 
pervasive that citizens’ access to basic services, such as street 
cleaning or police protection, depended on their political 
support for machine candidates. As one observer summarized, 
Philadelphia was “a city of petty crimes, small-time gamblers, 
and five-and-dime shakedowns, where too often a citizen’s 
first protection [was] not the law, the courts or the police, but 
his ward leader.” Id. (quoting Dickson Hartwell, 
Philadelphia: Corrupt and Not Contented, Collier’s, Aug. 7, 
1948, at 14). 
According to an expert report submitted by the City,
7
 
the Charter focused on the police because they were used by 
machine politicians to control voting. Expert Report by Elliott 
Shore, at 1 (hereinafter Shore Report). In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, the police engaged in aggressive get-out-
the-vote efforts, voter fraud, and voter intimidation, often 
resorting to brute force. For example, police officers turned a 
blind eye when “professional repeaters” cast fraudulent votes, 
                                                 
7
 The District Court found that the reports submitted 
by the City were “well-researched and credible.” A5 n.3. The 
FOP Plaintiffs have neither objected to the reports nor 
questioned their veracity. 
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and in some instances, beat those who protested these 
practices. Id. at 3.  
Individual officers who took offense at these excesses 
had “little choice but to comply with the wishes of the 
party—they held their jobs as long as they toed the line.” Id. 
In addition to distributing plum city jobs, the Republican 
machine taxed “political assessments” against the police and 
other city employees. These assessments—forced 
contributions often collected directly from the wages of city 
employees—were levied twice a year before general and 
primary elections. Id. at 2. By the first decade of the 20th 
century, approximately 94 percent of all city employees paid 
assessments to the Republican machine.  
The nefarious relationship between Philadelphia’s 
Republican machine and its police force culminated in 
September 1917 with the scandal of the “Bloody Fifth” Ward, 
where officers beat an opposition candidate, terrorized his 
supporters, and killed a detective who attempted to 
intervene.
8
 The incident led to the arrest of the mayor and the 
                                                 
8
 According to one description of the incident:  
In the weeks leading up to the primary, police 
had terrorized anyone in the ward who appeared 
to support [outsider] James Carey over his 
[machine-backed] opponent, Common 
Councilman Isaac Deutsch. . . . During the 
campaign, businesses owned by Carey 
supporters were raided and closed down, and 
their owners were beaten and arrested. A 
reporter who tried to attend a Deutsch campaign 
meeting was dragged outside by police, 
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conviction of six police officers, as well as public outcry for 
the insulation of the civic bureaucracy from politics. Amidst 
these calls for reform, in 1919 the Pennsylvania Assembly 
granted Philadelphia a new Charter, which enacted a series of 
reforms aimed at reducing corruption within government and 
the police department.
9
 For example, one provision of the 
1919 Charter forbade all police officers from coming within 
50 feet of a polling place, except to vote or when needed to 
make an arrest, after which the officers were required to “at 
once withdraw.” 1919 P.L. 581, Art. XIX, § 23. Another 
provision, targeted at the local machine’s practice of levying 
political assessments, prohibited members of the Philadelphia 
                                                                                                             
punched, and then arrested. Any “bluecoat,” as 
policemen were called, who refused to 
participate in the terror was transferred out of 
the district. 
Maximilian Potter, The Last Days of the Bloody Fifth, Phila. 
Magazine, Aug. 2000, available at 
http://www.phillymag.com/Archives/2000Aug/bloody1.html.  
9
 The 1919 Charter included several provisions that 
were contained in the Shern Law, a civil service code enacted 
by the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1905 that prohibited certain 
political activities by city employees. Among other 
restrictions, the Shern Law barred city employees from 
making and soliciting political assessments. Shore Report at 
5. Like the 1919 Charter, the Shern Law’s “effort to prohibit 
political activity by city employees . . . proved to be an abject 
failure.” Id. (quoting Clinton R. Woodruff, Some Permanent 
Results of the Philadelphia Upheaval of 1905–06, 13 Am. J. 
Soc. 252, 263 (1907)).  
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Police and Fire Departments from making any political 
contributions—the predecessor of the contribution ban at 
issue in this case. Id. One commentator described the purpose 
of the 1919 Charter’s restrictions, as well as early attempts at 
civil service regulations, this way: 
The history of the urban police in the early part 
of the twentieth century is closely entwined 
with the political history of the city. . . . 
Municipal and police corruption scandals 
profoundly affected police departments as 
reformers attempted to neutralize the police 
from political patronage and to curb police 
protection of rackets and organized criminal 
activity. . . . The first step was to transform the 
quasi-military bureaucracy of police 
organizations into a legalistic and technocratic 
bureaucracy. . . . It was a way to hold police 
accountable to bureaucratic rather than political 
authority. . . . Moreover, bureaucratization was 
a means of insulating the appointment and 
promotion of police officers from political 
patronage by requiring standards of merit. 
Shore Report at 5 (quoting Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police 
Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 Crime & Just. 51, 
57 (1992)) (emphases added and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
These efforts in 1919 had only minimal effect, as the 
patronage system persisted through the 1940s, and with it, 
rampant corruption, including politically sanctioned criminal 
enterprises facilitated by the police. Charter History at 4. “A 
vast three-cornered and intimate alliance was set up [among] 
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police, the corrupt politician and the gangster. Tributes were 
paid systematically by the privileged law-breaker to certain of 
the police and divided with certain of the politicians.” Shore 
Report at 7–8 (quoting David Harold Kurtzman, Methods of 
Controlling Votes in Philadelphia, Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, at 97–98 (1935)).  
It appears from the City’s reports that the 1919 Charter 
was ineffective not because it failed to place adequate 
restrictions on municipal employees, but because it retained a 
weak executive that was subject to political manipulation. 
See, e.g., Charter History at 3. Management was shared by 
the mayor, who was popularly elected, and members of the 
City Council, who were overwhelmingly selected and 
endorsed by the Republican machine. The City Council also 
retained the authority to appoint the Civil Service 
Commission; as a result, any civil service requirements that 
should have insulated public employees from political 
patronage were easily circumvented, and the restrictions in 
the 1919 Charter—such as the prohibition on collecting 
political assessments—were ignored. 
Attempts at reform were unsuccessful until 1949, 
when candidates endorsed by the Republican machine, who 
had stymied attempts to overhaul the 1919 Charter, were 
defeated in municipal elections. Charter History at 10. The 
Committee responsible for drafting what would later become 
the 1951 Home Rule Charter—the document at issue in this 
case—was emphatic about the city’s need for a strong, 
popularly elected executive. It also insisted that the reformed 
Charter be approved by the electorate of Philadelphia, so “the 
city could move away from the discredited 1919 Charter and 
the depredations of machine politics in the city.” Id. In 
addition to enacting structural changes to city government, 
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the 1951 Charter incorporated its predecessors’ controls on 
public employees’ participation in political activities in an 
attempt to move toward cleaner government.  
One of the restrictions carried over from the 1919 
Charter was section 10-107(3), the ban on political 
contributions by police officers that is at issue in this case. 
The annotation to that section elaborates the rationale for 
retaining the ban: “Voluntary contributions for political 
purposes are permitted to be made by civil service employees 
except that, because of the nature of their duties, policemen . . 
. may not under any circumstances make any contributions 
for political purposes.” Ann. to 351 Pa. Code § 10.10-107(3) 
(emphasis added). The annotation continues: “[m]erit 
principles of government employment require the 
divorcement of politics from such employment. They 
presuppose employment upon merit and not because of 
political connections, powers and pressures. They also 
presuppose that governmental employment will not serve as a 
means for political tribute to maintain political parties and 
regimes.” Id. 
In addition to the 1951 Home Rule Charter, the City of 
Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have 
instituted a number of other reforms to promote integrity and 
professionalism within the police force. The Philadelphia 
Civil Service Regulations, which were enacted in 1953, 
contain detailed rules as to the hiring, transfer, layoff, and 
discipline of city employees. Likewise, Pennsylvania Act 111 
of 1968, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 217.1–10, and the 
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 
211.1–13, have enabled police officers to organize in unions 
for collective bargaining purposes, with the result of 
insulating individual officers from the political pressure of 
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negotiating their own employment contracts. As the FOP 
Plaintiffs observe in their appellate brief, “[n]ow, virtually 
every aspect of the working conditions of police officers is 
subjected to scrutiny by labor arbitrators, the judiciary, and 
the Civil Service Commission.” FOP Br. at 6. 
For its part, the City maintains that police corruption 
remains a serious concern. As support for this position, the 
City entered into the record newspaper articles about police 
and official misconduct, which describe, inter alia, police 
officers disciplined for committing crimes, engaging in drug 
dealing, and abusing citizens. One article notes that 
“corruption on the force has always been a problem,” and 
details the Philadelphia Police Department’s ongoing 
attempts to address the “public’s confidence in the 
department’s ability to rid itself of bad cops.” A333–34. 
Another article reports that the department’s reputation for 
integrity was significantly undermined when twenty-nine 
officers were convicted of corruption. The record is replete 
with articles about the recent trials and convictions of judges 
and public employees for fraud, kickbacks, and extortion.  
D 
It is important to note that the Charter ban applied 
originally not only to the police, but also to the fire 
department. This changed in 2003, however, when the 
Philadelphia firefighters’ union, in a case remarkably similar 
to this one, successfully challenged the ban as an 
unconstitutional infringement on its members’ First 
Amendment rights. Phila. Fire Fighters’ Union Local 22, 
AFL-CIO v. City of Phila., 286 F. Supp. 2d 476, 482 (E.D. Pa. 
2003). As a result, the union obtained a permanent injunction 
preventing the City from disciplining uniformed firefighters 
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who contributed to the union’s political action committee, 
FIREPAC. The City did not appeal the decision and no longer 
enforces the ban against Philadelphia firefighters.  
On April 28, 2011, FOP, relying on the Fire Fighters 
decision and the City Council’s enactment of Bill No. 
060181, demanded that the City initiate payroll deductions to 
COPPAC for FOP members. The City responded that the 
Charter ban remained in effect against the police despite the 
Fire Fighters decision, which it considered distinguishable. 
The City continues to maintain that the Charter ban is 
justified against the police in light of the “unique and 
critically important nature of the duties of the Police 
Department and its status in the community.” A92. It notes 
that “[p]olice, because of their position as guardians of the 
public safety and impartial enforcers of the law, must be, and 
must be perceived to be, above reproach and shielded from 
politically-influenced decision making.” Id. According to the 
City, “[s]uch public entanglement in politics, potentially 
damaging to public trust in police impartiality, is legitimately 
sought to be avoided by the complete divorcement of the 
police from financial support of particular candidates.” A93. 
E 
On May 18, 2011, after learning that the City intended 
to enforce violations of the Charter ban, the FOP Plaintiffs 
commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
claiming, inter alia, that the ban violated their First 
Amendment rights to political expression and association. 
The District Court granted the City’s motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the case. Lodge No. 5 of the 
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Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Phila., No. cv-11-3256, 
2013 WL 638615 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2013). 
The District Court determined that the standard set 
forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454 
(1995), controlled, and required the City to establish that “the 
interests of [police department] members, and of the public, 
in [police department] members’ political contributions are 
outweighed by the City’s interest in preventing those 
contributions’ necessary impact on the actual operation of 
city government.” 2013 WL 638615, at *4 (citing NTEU, 513 
U.S. at 468). 
The District Court noted that the ban’s impact on 
speech regarding issues of public concern was mitigated by 
the fact that police officers, pursuant to the Charter’s 
implementing regulation, could still express their views about 
city government in a nonpartisan way. Id. at *7. Moreover, 
“Philadelphia’s history of government corruption reveals [the 
City’s concerns] are real and the need for the ban is 
compelling.” Id. at *8. The Court found that while the precise 
impact of the ban was unclear, it was a part of comprehensive 
reforms that played a role in dismantling the old Republican 
political machine, curtailing unchecked political patronage, 
and rebuilding public confidence in the police department and 
city government. Id. at *9. Further, “the record . . . does not 
demonstrate that the threat of political corruption has been 
eliminated,” and “corruption within city government, 
including within the [police department], remains a major 
concern.” Id. 
Having determined that the City established real 
harms, the Court ruled that the ban “alleviate[d] these harms 
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in a direct and material way,” and constituted a “reasonable 
response to the posited harms.” Id. at *10 (quoting NTEU, 
513 U.S. at 475–76). It found the ban was narrowly tailored 
because the City identified a “means through which the 
corrupt patronage was sustained—compelled political 
contributions from [police department] members—and cut off 
that source of party control.” Id. The Court also ruled that the 
fact that donations to political candidates would be made by 
COPPAC did not insulate members of the police department 
from political pressure. Id. Accordingly, it concluded that the 
Charter ban and its implementing regulation did not violate 
the First Amendment rights of the union and its members. 
This timely appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
summary judgment, Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., 
Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2003), and will affirm if the 
moving party establishes that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
III 
This case presents a narrow question: whether the 
Charter ban and its implementing regulation, as applied to the 
FOP Plaintiffs, violate the First Amendment. We do not 
consider the full sweep of activities potentially restricted by 
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the ban—for instance, whether police officers may be 
prohibited from contributing directly to political candidates. 
Instead, we review whether the Charter ban, in the context of 
the other political activities permitted and prohibited by 
Regulation 8, may constitutionally bar Philadelphia police 
officers from making voluntary contributions to a political 
action committee. 
A 
As the City rightly concedes, the Charter ban on 
political contributions constitutes a substantial burden on the 
FOP Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976); see also McCutcheon v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014) (plurality 
opinion) (“There is no right more basic in our democracy than 
the right to participate in electing our political leaders.”). 
Indeed, “the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent 
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political 
office.’” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (quoting Monitor 
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). Limitations on 
campaign contributions, such as the Charter ban at issue here, 
prevent the “symbolic expression of support” evidenced by 
that donation. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Therefore, such 
restrictions significantly curtail the exercise of an individual’s 
right to participate in the electoral process through both 
political expression and political association. See id. at 44–45.  
There is no question that “money amassed from the 
economic marketplace” has a significant role in funding 
political speech. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010). The amount an individual or group 
spends on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily affects “the number of issues discussed, the depth 
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of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. For this reason, political action 
committees, such as COPPAC, play an increasingly dominant 
role in politics: by pooling funds and voices, they present an 
opportunity for individuals to participate effectively in the 
political process. Cf. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Conservative Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) (“To 
say that [plaintiffs’] collective action in pooling their 
resources to amplify their voices is not entitled to First 
Amendment protection would subordinate the voices of those 
with modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy 
to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own 
resources.”). 
Here, the FOP Plaintiffs claim that their inability to 
contribute to COPPAC has prevented the police from 
advocating effectively on issues of concern. They have 
presented compelling evidence that the Charter ban has hurt 
the interests of the police, and that FOP, with its depleted 
accounts, has been unable to disseminate information or 
convince legislators of police officers’ needs and concerns 
regarding wages, pension benefits, and working conditions. 
B 
Because the Charter ban restricts officers’ rights to 
speak on matters of public concern, see Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983), we review the ban using the 
framework of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968), and balance “the interests of the [public employee], as 
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and 
the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.” Id. at 568. 
 22 
 
In NTEU, the Supreme Court clarified how courts 
should apply Pickering when a restriction operated as an ex 
ante prohibition on speech. 513 U.S. at 467. NTEU involved a 
provision of the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 501(b), 
that prohibited government employees from accepting 
honoraria for making speeches or writing articles, without 
regard to whether the speech or article was related to the 
official’s duties. See 513 U.S. at 457. In striking down the 
honoraria ban, the Court noted that, unlike in Pickering and 
its progeny, the statute did “not involve a post hoc analysis of 
one employee’s speech and its impact on that employee’s 
public responsibilities,” but rather resulted in a “wholesale 
deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive 
number of potential speakers.” Id. at 466–67. Because the ban 
chilled speech before it occurred, the Court stated “the 
Government’s burden is greater with respect to this statutory 
restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated 
disciplinary decision.” Id. at 468. “The Government must 
show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast 
group of present and future employees in a broad range of 
present and future expression are outweighed by the 
expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual operation’ of the 
Government.” Id. (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571). 
Accordingly, 
[w]hen the Government defends a regulation on 
speech as a means to redress past harms or 
prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than 
simply “posit the existence of the disease 
sought to be cured.” It must demonstrate that 
the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact 
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alleviate these harms in a direct and material 
way. 
Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)) (emphases added). 
While the Court in NTEU recognized that Congress 
had an “undeniably powerful” interest in maintaining its 
employees’ administrative integrity, it deemed the ban 
“crudely crafted” to serve this interest. Id. at 477. For 
example, although payment of honoraria to higher-ranking 
officials could create an appearance of impropriety, the same 
could not be said of the “vast group of present and future 
employees” “with negligible power to confer favor on those 
who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles.” 
Id. at 468, 473. Nor had Congress provided any “evidence of 
misconduct related to honoraria in the vast rank and file of 
federal employees.” Id. at 472. The Court also questioned 
Congress’s rationale for applying the honoraria ban to 
speeches and articles that had nothing to do with employees’ 
official duties, as well as its justification for limiting the ban 
to “expressive activities” when other extracurricular activities 
had similar opportunity for abuse. Id. at 472–74, 475. These 
inconsistencies, among others, “diminish[ed] the credibility 
of the Government’s rationale.” Id. at 476. 
C 
We had occasion to review the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NTEU in Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228 
(3d Cir. 2002). In that case, we held that the NTEU rubric 
applied whenever a “‘generally applicable statute or 
regulation, as opposed to a particular disciplinary action,’ 
restricts a government employee’s expression on a matter of 
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public concern.” Id. at 237 (quoting Latino Officers Ass’n v. 
City of New York, 196 F.3d 458, 464 (2d Cir. 1999)). We 
clarified that the NTEU standard governed even when a law 
regulated only a narrow category of speech of employees of a 
single city department—in Swartzwelder, a municipal order 
that required employees of the Pittsburgh Police Bureau to 
obtain permission before testifying as an expert witness in 
court. See id. 
The Charter ban at issue in this appeal is similarly a 
“generally applicable statute” that applies to employees of the 
Philadelphia Police Department. Consistent with 
Swartzwelder, we agree with the District Court that NTEU 
provides the standard applicable to this case.
10
 
                                                 
10
 Perhaps anticipating it has not made a sufficient 
showing under NTEU, the City urges us to eschew that case 
and instead follow an alternative framework purportedly set 
forth in U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National 
Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (Letter Carriers), 
413 U.S. 548 (1973). There, the Supreme Court found that 
Congress’s concerns about bureaucratic efficiency and 
political influence justified certain restrictions on employees’ 
overt political participation. Id. at 564. The City asks us to 
extend Letter Carriers’s holding to restrictions on political 
contributions, contending that “restrictions on government 
employee political activity are accorded greater deference 
than other restrictions on employee speech.” City Br. at 20 
(emphasis added). 
However, as we discuss in section V.A, infra, Letter 
Carriers did not set forth a different standard for reviewing 
restrictions on political activity, but instead represents an 
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Accordingly, to prevail, the City must make two 
showings: first, that it has “real, not merely conjectural” 
harms; and second, that the ban as applied to the FOP 
Plaintiffs addresses these harms in a “direct and material 
way.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475. As we shall explain, we agree 
with the District Court that the City has established real 
harms, but we disagree with its conclusion that the Charter 
ban is an appropriately tailored means of addressing those 
concerns. 
 
                                                                                                             
instance where the Supreme Court applied Pickering’s case-
by-case balancing test and found that the government’s 
interests prevailed. Nor did the NTEU Court, in distinguishing 
Letter Carriers, suggest that political restrictions should be 
reviewed under a more deferential framework. Rather, it 
found that the Hatch Act’s “employee-protective rationale” 
was more compelling than the honoraria ban’s “general 
interest in workplace efficiency,” and that, unlike its efforts 
with the honoraria ban, “Congress effectively designed the 
Hatch Act to combat demonstrated ill effects” of its interests. 
513 U.S. at 471. Indeed, the NTEU Court explicitly cast 
Letter Carriers as a specific application of the Pickering test, 
clarifying: “Because the discussion in [Letter Carriers] 
essentially restated in balancing terms our approval of the 
Hatch Act in Public Workers v. Mitchell, we did not 
determine how the components of the Pickering balance 
should be analyzed in the context of a sweeping statutory 
impediment to speech.” Id. at 467 (citation omitted). Absent a 
more persuasive argument, we decline to read Letter Carriers 
as creating a separate framework for review, and apply NTEU 
in accordance with our prior opinion in Swartzwelder. 
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IV 
To demonstrate “real, not merely conjectural” harms, a 
government must not only identify legitimate interests, but 
also provide evidence that those concerns exist. Id. at 472 
(finding that Congress had failed to show “real” harms 
because, while its “interest [was] undeniably powerful,” it 
failed to cite evidence of misconduct); cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000) (“We have never 
accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First 
Amendment burden.”). 
Here, the City has articulated four legitimate interests 
drawn from its experience with machine politics. First, the 
City must ensure that the police enforce the law without bias 
or favoritism, which includes even the appearance of 
“practicing political justice.” City Br. at 26. Second, it seeks 
to enable employment and advancement within the 
Philadelphia Police Department based on merit, not political 
affiliation or performance. Third, the City wishes to protect 
subordinate employees from having to support candidates 
favored by their superiors. And finally, the City has an 
interest in maintaining the efficiency and quality of the 
services provided by the police.  
The interests identified by the City have longstanding 
pedigree and have been repeatedly recognized by the 
Supreme Court as justifying the curtailment of public 
employee speech. See, e.g., Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564; 
see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (emphasizing the 
continued validity of Letter Carriers and its proposition that 
“there are certain governmental functions that cannot operate 
without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech”); 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611–12; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 101. 
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In Letter Carriers, for example, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a section of the Hatch Act that 
prohibited federal employees from taking “an active part in 
political management or in political campaigns.” 413 U.S. at 
550 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7324(A)(2)). Under that law, federal 
employees were precluded from, inter alia, running for 
political office, organizing a partisan political campaign, and 
actively soliciting votes and funds for a candidate.
11
 Id. at 
556. 
                                                 
11
 The provision of the Hatch Act at issue in Letter 
Carriers, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(A)(2), provides in part: 
(a) An employee in an Executive agency or an 
individual employee employed by the 
government of the District of Columbia may 
not— 
(1) use his official authority or influence for the 
purpose of interfering with or affecting the 
result of an election; or  
(2) take an active part in political management 
or in political campaigns. 
For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase 
“an active part in political management or in 
political campaigns” means those acts of 
political management or political campaigning 
which were prohibited on the part of employees 
in the competitive service before July 19, 1940, 
by determinations of the Civil Service 
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The Supreme Court’s decision turned on Congress’s 
legitimate interest in regulating the conduct of its employees: 
it reasoned that such restrictions were necessary if 
government were “to operate effectively and fairly, elections 
are to play their proper part in representative government, and 
employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from 
improper influences.” Id. at 564. Four interests—which the 
City echoes in this case—were particularly pertinent. First, 
Congress had a generalized interest in ensuring that federal 
employees administered the “impartial execution of the laws” 
in accordance with congressional, not partisan, will. Id. at 
565. The Hatch Act’s mandate against partisan political 
activities “reduce[d] [such] hazards to fair and effective 
government.” Id.  
Second, it was important for Congress to maintain a 
civil service that was politically neutral in fact and in 
appearance, “if confidence in the system of representative 
                                                                                                             
Commission under the rules prescribed by the 
President. 
(b) An employee or individual to whom 
subsection (a) of this section applies retains the 
right to vote as he chooses and to express his 
opinion on political subjects and candidates. 
The Hatch Act included a specific exemption for political 
contributions, providing that “[a]n employee may make 
political contributions to any committee, organization, or 
person not employed by the United States.” Id.; see also 5 
C.F.R. pt. 733 (allowing employees to “[m]ake a financial 
contribution to a political party or organization”). 
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Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” Id. 
Relatedly, Congress expressed a legitimate interest in 
preventing “the rapidly expanding Government work force 
[from being] employed to build a powerful, invincible and 
perhaps corrupt political machine.” Id. The Hatch Act, by 
barring federal employees from formal positions in partisan 
political groups, addressed these concerns because it 
precluded parties from “using . . . federal employees . . . to 
man [their] political structure and political campaigns.” Id. at 
565–66. 
Finally, the Court highlighted Congress’s interest in 
ensuring that federal employees did not feel pressured or 
coerced, either expressly or implicitly, to vote or perform 
political chores “to curry favor with their superiors rather than 
act out of their own beliefs.” Id. at 566. These, the Court held, 
were “obviously important interests sought to be served by 
the limitations on partisan political activities.” Id. at 564 
(emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of these interests in 
Letter Carriers adhered to almost a century of consistent 
precedent. In Mitchell, a case whose holding Letter Carriers 
“unhesitatingly reaffirm[ed],” id. at 556, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Hatch Act’s restrictions against an employee who 
had neither policymaking authority nor contact with the 
public, reasoning that Congress had a legitimate fear of “the 
cumulative effect on employee morale of political activity by 
all employees who could be induced to participate actively.” 
330 U.S. at 101. Mitchell, in turn, relied on Ex parte Curtis, 
106 U.S. 371 (1882), which permitted Congress to prohibit 
political contributions between government employees. 
There, the Supreme Court validated Congress’s concern that 
government favor could be channeled through political 
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connections: “If contributions . . . may be solicited by others 
in official authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a 
request may end as a demand.” Id. at 374. The Curtis Court 
noted that such contributions would “quite as likely be made . 
. . to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a political 
privilege.” Id.  
In light of the City’s “obviously important interests,” 
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564, our inquiry turns to whether 
the City has presented adequate evidence of harm connecting 
political contributions with systemic corruption by the police. 
As we summarized in section I.C, supra, the City has entered 
into the record over a century of “concrete experience with 
the evils of the political spoils system.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 
483 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The City has shown, and the FOP Plaintiffs concede, that the 
City’s concerns about the connection between police abuse 
and machine politics were justified when the Home Rule 
Charter was enacted in 1951. 
Over sixty years later, however, the record is 
essentially devoid of the harms that motivated the Charter’s 
passage. To suggest today that there is a Republican machine 
that controls Philadelphia politics would be viewed as absurd 
by even a casual political observer. Indeed, with that party 
having been reduced to a mere 12 percent of registered 
voters,
12
 it is now reasonable to conclude that the Democratic 
                                                 
12
 As of June 30, 2014, of the 1,031,913 registered 
voters in Philadelphia County, 78 percent identified as 
Democrats and 12 percent registered as Republicans. See Pa. 
Dep’t of State, Voter Registration Statistics, available at 
http://www.dos.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/voter_
registration_statistics/12725. Over the last decade alone, 
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Party dominates the city’s politics.13 Regardless of whether 
such is the case, the City submitted no evidence to suggest 
that the Democratic Party has corrupted, or is attempting to 
corrupt, the Philadelphia Police as the Republican Party had 
done during the first half of the twentieth century.
14
 
                                                                                                             
Republicans have experienced a 30 percent decline in 
registered voters. Id. 
13
 In the 2012 general election, Democrats won all 40 
of the races on the ballot in Philadelphia County. In 2007, 
they prevailed in 21 of 22 races in Philadelphia’s municipal 
elections. See Office of Phila. City Comm’rs, Prior Year 
Election Results, available at: 
http://www.philadelphiavotes.com/en/resources-a-data/prior-
year-election-results. 
14
 Our observation that the City failed to offer evidence 
of such harm should not be taken to mean that political 
corruption writ large no longer exists. The relatively recent 
convictions of local Democratic politicians suggest that 
corruption remains an ongoing problem in Philadelphia. See, 
e.g., Ex-City Official Is Convicted in Philadelphia Corruption 
Case, N.Y. Times, May 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/10/national/10philly.html?f
ta=y&_r= (conviction of Philadelphia City Treasurer in 2005 
for, inter alia, fraud and extortion); Councilman Found Guilty 
on 18 Counts, The Daily Pennsylvanian, Mar. 20, 2006, 
available at 
http://www.thedp.com/article/2006/03/councilman_found_gui
lty_on_18_counts (conviction of City Councilman Rick 
Mariano in 2006 for bribery); see also George Anastasia, 
George Schwartz, Abscam Figure, is Dead at 95, Phila. 
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Further, the statutory backdrop of the Charter ban has 
changed significantly since it was first enacted in 1951. The 
City now has in place a system of comprehensive civil service 
regulations that detail requirements for civic employment, 
advancement, and dismissal. Collective bargaining 
arrangements further insulate individual officers from the 
pressure of negotiating their own employment contracts. 
Moreover, the City offered no evidence that FOP’s internal 
mechanisms are linked with hiring and advancement within 
the Philadelphia Police Department or that officers are 
pressured to contribute to political causes supported by FOP. 
In fact, the City’s only showing of present-day police 
corruption consists of articles about “dirty cops” and corrupt 
politicians. We recognize that such misconduct by officers 
and politicians remains a significant concern. But these 
problems are of a completely different nature than those that 
gave rise to the 1951 Charter. Unlike the systemic corruption 
that led to the Charter ban, the City’s episodic and 
individualized evidence shows only that human frailty affects 
police officers, just as it affects all walks of life. Cf. 
Wachsman v. City of Dallas, 704 F.2d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 
1983) (noting that similar contribution restrictions targeted 
“such human traits as personal ambition, greed, fear, and the 
like”). Thus, while the City has demonstrated historic harm in 
                                                                                                             
Inquirer, Mar. 27, 2010, available at 
http://articles.philly.com/2010-03-
27/news/25215897_1_council-president-councilman-
political-career (describing the role of several members of the 
Philadelphia City Council in the 1980 Abscam scandal). We 
emphasize that the City has provided no evidence that these 
convictions are related to systemic police corruption.  
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spades, its evidence of recent politically-orchestrated harm is 
non-existent. 
This inadequacy does not, however, render incorrect 
the District Court’s finding that the City satisfied the first 
prong of NTEU. A legislature need not, in the absence of 
concrete evidence to the contrary, rejustify past harms in light 
of changed circumstances.
15
 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n 
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 n.9 (2003), abrogated on 
other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. at 567; United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). Courts have taken a cautious 
approach when reviewing longstanding restrictions, 
acknowledging that when regulation has succeeded, it is often 
difficult to discover evidence that the targeted abuses 
continue to exist. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 457 (2001) 
(recognizing the “difficulty of mustering evidence to support 
long-enforced statutes” because there is no recent experience 
absent the restriction) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 567 (deferring to 
Congress’s determination of harm, as the Court was “not now 
in any position to dispute it”). This is true with corruption, 
which, given its amorphous nature, is particularly hard to 
quantify and prove. As a result, “judicial restraint is 
particularly warranted where . . . we deal with a [legislative] 
                                                 
15
 This rule does not, as the FOP Plaintiffs contend, 
place an improper burden on the police to prove an absence 
of harm. The City has already demonstrated harm through 
historic data; its concerns are not “merely conjectural” 
because they actually occurred. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475. 
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judgment that has remained essentially unchanged.” 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 n.9. 
In our opinion, the Charter ban warrants such judicial 
caution: it addressed real harms at the time of its enactment, 
was the product of decades of legislative adjustment, and has 
remained unchanged for more than six decades.
16
 Cf. Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 
U.S. 364, 401 n.27 (1984) (noting that the Hatch Act 
“evolved over a century of governmental experience with less 
restrictive alternatives that proved to be inadequate to 
maintain the effective operation of government”). This does 
not mean that a government may indefinitely restrict its 
employees’ First Amendment rights by referencing some 
bygone harm. Cf. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456 (“The 
absence of such a prospect today belies the Government’s 
asserted objective of preventing corruption or its 
appearance.”). But here, the FOP Plaintiffs have offered little 
to dispel the City’s concerns. Although civil service reforms 
and collective bargaining legislation have significantly altered 
the regulatory environment, the FOP Plaintiffs have not 
                                                 
16
 The FOP Plaintiffs contend that City Bill No. 
060181—the ordinance that provides for payroll deductions 
to COPPAC—constituted a legislative determination that the 
contribution ban is no longer necessary. We disagree because 
the ordinance itself has no legal significance, as there is no 
evidence the City Council had the Charter ban in mind when 
it enacted the ordinance, and the Charter may be amended 
only through the submission of proposed changes to the 
general electorate. See Pa. Cons. Stat. § 13106. 
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shown that the City’s concerns of police partiality and 
politicized personnel practices are now unfounded.
17
 
                                                 
17
 The FOP Plaintiffs cite Fire Fighters and Shelby 
County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), as 
requiring legislators to provide present-day evidence of harm. 
These cases, however, are distinguishable because those 
plaintiffs demonstrated an absence of harm. 
In Fire Fighters, which struck down the Charter ban as 
applied against Philadelphia’s firefighters, the district court 
found that the City’s two proffered concerns were 
unsubstantiated by the record. 286 F. Supp. 2d at 482. First, 
the City contended—as it does in this appeal—that the ban on 
political contributions was necessary to prevent politicized 
hiring and promotion practices. However, the union presented 
evidence that in spite of politician intervention, “the [Fire] 
Commissioner relied on detailed protocols on making 
personnel decisions.” Id. at 481. Philadelphia’s police, by 
contrast, have not made such a demonstration. Second, the 
City contended that firefighters’ donations would 
compromise the integrity of fire code inspections. This, too, 
the district court found illogical, as non-uniformed employees 
of the fire department, who could contribute to FIREPAC (the 
union’s political action committee), also conducted fire 
inspections. Id. at 481–82. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby 
County rested on conclusive evidence that the circumstances 
motivating the enactment of section 4 of the Voting Rights 
Act had changed “dramatically.” 133 S. Ct. at 2625. There, 
the Shelby County Court, in assessing the validity of section 4 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, found that the provision’s 
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Moreover, the City has demonstrated a real risk of 
future harm. For example, COPPAC’s ability to fund 
candidates for judicial office may prove to be a concern, as 
the police frequently testify in court and interact with the 
judicial system. FOP’s practice of distributing “courtesy 
cards” to large donors also may threaten public confidence in 
the police’s impartial enforcement of the law: because police 
exercise significant discretion in their everyday work, a card 
that extends the union’s “every courtesy” to its holder may 
become an improper ticket to preferential treatment. 
Similarly, the institution of paycheck deduction 
mechanisms—here, City Bill No. 060181—may create 
pressure on individual officers to donate to COPPAC, 
because when contributions are “solicited by others in official 
authority . . . what begins as a request may end as a demand.” 
Curtis, 106 U.S. at 374. 
In sum, the District Court did not err when it found 
that the City identified legitimate interests in the efficiency 
and integrity of its police. And while there is no recent 
evidence of systemic political corruption of the police, the 
FOP Plaintiffs have failed to dispel the City’s legitimate 
historic concerns. Accordingly, we conclude that the City has 
demonstrated “real, not merely conjectural” harms under 
NTEU. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
formula relied on decades-old data that captured 
discriminatory literacy tests and poll taxes—practices that had 
since been eliminated. See id. at 2621–22.  
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V 
This showing of harm does not render the Charter ban 
constitutional, however, as the City must also satisfy NTEU’s 
second prong—namely, that the ban will “in fact alleviate [its 
proposed] harms in a direct and material way.” 513 U.S. at 
475 (citation omitted). 
While NTEU did not explicitly establish a tailoring 
requirement, we have noted that “such a requirement seems to 
be implicit in the Court’s discussion.” Swartzwelder, 297 F.3d 
at 236. Indeed, in holding unconstitutional the honoraria ban 
at issue in that case, the NTEU Court found that the ban was 
“crudely crafted” and not “a reasonable response to the 
[government’s] posited harms.” 513 U.S. at 475–77; see also 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456 (“In the First Amendment 
context, fit matters.”). Proper tailoring does not require the 
regulation to redress the harm entirely. See Mariani v. United 
States, 212 F.3d 761, 774 (3d Cir. 2000). But when “the 
burden comes closer to impairing core first amendment 
values, or impairs some given first amendment value more 
substantially, the requisite closeness of fit of means and end 
increases accordingly.” Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n of La., 
565 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1977) (distilling Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1976), Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, and Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548); see also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 483–84 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(under Pickering, “[a]s the magnitude of intrusion on 
employees’ interests rises, so does the Government’s burden 
of justification”). 
Traditionally, contributions are not afforded the same 
protections as direct forms of political expression—for 
example, campaign expenditures—because “the 
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transformation of contributions into political debates involves 
speech by someone other than the contributor.” Beaumont, 
539 U.S. at 161–62 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21). 
“[B]ecause contributions lie closer to the edges than to the 
core of political expression,” restrictions on political 
contributions are “merely ‘marginal,’” id. at 161, and are 
permissible if the government can show they are “closely 
drawn” to serve a “sufficiently important interest.” Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 25; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437 
(adhering to “Buckley’s distinction between contributions and 
expenditures and the corresponding distinction in standards of 
review”). 
But “[e]ven when the Court is not applying strict 
scrutiny,” it still requires “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, 
but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the 
interest served, . . . that employs not necessarily the least 
restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve 
the desired objective.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456–57 
(quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For 
the reasons that follow, we find that the Charter ban, as 
implemented and applied in this case, is poorly tailored to the 
City’s articulated interests. Because the ban is not “closely 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 
freedoms,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, it unconstitutionally 
restricts the FOP Plaintiffs’ participation in the political 
process. 
A 
The City argues that Letter Carriers requires us to 
defer to legislative judgment when determining whether a 
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restriction on political activity adequately balances the 
interests of the government and its employees. As support for 
this proposition, it emphasizes the following quotation from 
Letter Carriers: 
Although Congress is free to strike a different 
balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the 
balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the 
obviously important interests sought to be 
served by the limitations on partisan political 
activities now contained in the Hatch Act. 
413 U.S. at 564. Several courts, including two other courts of 
appeals, have relied on this language to uphold regulations 
prohibiting public employees from contributing directly to 
political campaigns. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters v. 
City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding a provision that prohibited employees from giving 
money to any candidate for mayor or city council); Reeder v. 
Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 733 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding a Missouri statute that prevented police officers 
from contributing to political campaigns); Wachsman, 704 
F.2d at 165 (upholding a provision in Dallas’s municipal 
charter that banned public employees from donating to local 
candidates). 
We decline the City’s invitation to read Letter Carriers 
as requiring us to abandon the NTEU fit analysis. The 
Supreme Court in Letter Carriers did not simply defer to 
legislative judgment as to what constituted appropriate 
regulation. Instead, after a careful weighing of the relevant 
interests, the Court held that Congress had satisfied the 
Pickering analysis. 413 U.S. 564 (quoting Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 568). Indeed, the Court devoted much of its analysis 
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to matching the Hatch Act’s restrictions to Congress’s 
interests. It found that Congress had demonstrated how 
federal employees’ public participation in political 
campaigns—for example, as a candidate or the head of a 
political group—had the direct effect of creating an 
appearance of impropriety and of risking that federal service 
could be used for political ends. See id. In essence, Congress 
had found a proper solution—perhaps one among many—that 
created a “sustainable” balance between its concerns and its 
employees’ First Amendment interests. Id.; see also NTEU, 
513 U.S. at 467 (characterizing the Letter Carriers decision 
as an application of the Pickering balancing test). 
Nor does the City’s invocation of Curtis and Kelley v. 
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), prove persuasive. In Curtis, 
the Supreme Court upheld a statute that prohibited federal 
employees from soliciting, receiving, and donating political 
contributions to each other. 106 U.S. at 371. In sustaining the 
ban, the Court was convinced by Congress’s rationales, 
reminiscent of those offered here, that “government itself may 
be made to furnish indirectly the money to defray the 
expenses of keeping the [controlling] political party in 
power,” and that “a refusal [to contribute] may lead to putting 
good men out of the service, [and] liberal payments may be 
made the ground for keeping poor ones in.” Id. at 375. In our 
view, Curtis is of limited relevance to this appeal because it 
was limited to contributions between employees. In fact, the 
Curtis Court was explicit in clarifying that the statute at issue 
did not “prohibit all contributions” by federal employees for 
political purposes, but “simply forbids their receiving from or 
giving to each other.” Id. at 371–72 (emphasis added). Curtis 
thus left for another day the consideration of other types of 
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political contributions, such as those made directly to 
candidates and to political action committees. 
In Kelley, the Supreme Court upheld a county 
regulation that limited the hair length of male police officers, 
reasoning that the restriction was justified given the “overall 
need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity” in the 
police force. 425 U.S. at 246. In doing so, the Court included 
broad dicta regarding appropriate restrictions on the police: 
[The county] has, in accordance with its well-
established duty to keep the peace, placed 
myriad demands upon the members of the 
police force, duties which have no counterpart 
with respect to the public at large. Respondent 
must wear a standard uniform, specific in each 
detail. When in uniform he must salute the flag. 
He may not take an active role in local political 
affairs by way of being a party delegate or 
contributing or soliciting political 
contributions. He may not smoke in public. 
Id. at 245–46 (emphasis added). The City views the expansive 
language italicized above as a “fairly clear implication . . . 
that a restriction on contributions would be upheld.” City Br. 
at 29 (quoting Reeder, 733 F.2d at 548). We disagree, 
because the dicta cited cannot bear the weight the City places 
upon it. See Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139–
40 (1941) (departing from “[l]oose language” when 
considering a question “with our eyes open and in the light of 
full consideration”); cf. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 
(declining to be bound by Buckley’s anticircumvention 
holding because the discussion consisted of “three sentences . 
 42 
 
. . that were written without the benefit of full briefing or 
argument”). 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Reeder, though it too 
upheld a ban on contributions by police officers, is similarly 
distinguishable. The plaintiff in Reeder, an officer of the 
Kansas City Police Department, was fired for donating to the 
campaign of a congressional candidate in Independence, 
Missouri. 733 F.2d at 545. He claimed that the ban should not 
apply to his donation because the candidate had no 
connection with local politics or the city’s police department. 
Id. The Eighth Circuit, citing a similar state court decision, 
Pollard v. Board of Police Commissioners, 665 S.W.2d 333 
(Mo. 1984) (en banc),
18
 rejected this argument, reasoning that 
                                                 
18
 In Pollard, a Kansas City police officer was 
dismissed after his superiors discovered he had contributed to 
the campaign of a candidate for his congressional district, in 
violation of the same Missouri statute. 665 S.W.2d at 335. 
The Reeder court adopted the reasoning in Pollard in its 
entirety. 733 F.2d at 545 (“[T]here is no point in repeating an 
analysis already so well set out.”). 
Like Philadelphia, Kansas City was beholden to a 
patronage system of politics—there, the Democratic Party 
controlled by “Boss Tom” Pendergast—which was sustained 
in part by police brutality:  
Policemen who belonged to the party out of 
power were discharged. Those who remained, 
and those newly hired, were obliged to profess 
adherence to and to contribute a portion of their 
salaries to the support of the dominant political 
party. There followed substantial discoveries of 
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the ban was rational given the close connection between 
local, state, and federal politics. See Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 
340. According to the Reeder court, a contribution to a 
federal congressional campaign might well benefit a Kansas 
City politician who had “made common cause” with a federal 
candidate, 733 F.2d 547 (quoting Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 
340), raising the concern that a politician could “influence for 
good or ill the career of a city police officer.” Id. 
Unlike Reeder, this appeal does not involve officers’ 
direct contributions to political candidates, and thus does not 
implicate the Eighth Circuit’s concerns about quid pro quo 
corruption.
19
 The Supreme Court reiterated just last Term that 
                                                                                                             
corruption touching not only the police 
department but the entire governmental 
structure of Kansas City. 
Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 335. Like the Charter ban in this case, 
the Missouri statute aimed to protect the police from the 
pressure to contribute to the party in power, to protect the 
public from a politicized police force, and to guard against a 
general rise in municipal corruption. Id. 
19
 It is also important to note that Reeder predates 
NTEU, which imposed a higher burden on the government to 
justify ex ante restrictions on employee speech, and 
demanded that the government articulate a tighter fit between 
its means and ends. Reeder’s reliance on Letter Carriers—the 
most relevant case at the time—and its since-repudiated 
characterization of public employment as a conditional 
privilege, compare McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 
N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892) (“[A policeman] may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
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“there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its 
appearance when money flows through independent actors 
[such as a political action committee] to a candidate, as when 
a donor contributes to a candidate directly.” McCutcheon, 134 
S. Ct. at 1452. “The risk of quid pro quo corruption is 
generally applicable only to ‘the narrow category of money 
gifts that are directed . . . to a candidate or officeholder.’” Id. 
(quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 
310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)); see also Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826 (2011) (finding that the 
intervention of a political action committee that is 
independent of a specific candidate breaks the “candidate-
funding circuit”). 
Here, the individual Appellants wish to contribute to 
COPPAC, a political action committee that serves as an 
intermediary between donors and candidates. As the FOP 
Plaintiffs emphasize, donors to COPPAC have no say in how 
the funds are disbursed because FOP’s leadership determines 
whether funds are used for information or for political 
campaigns. In light of this separation, since Citizens United, 
courts of appeals have consistently invalidated restrictions on 
contributions to political action committees, even under 
Buckley’s more relaxed standard for restrictions on 
contributions. See N.Y. Progress & Protection PAC v. Walsh, 
                                                                                                             
constitutional right to be a policeman.”), with Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967), suggest that the 
Eighth Circuit may have given undue deference to the 
government’s interests.  
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733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
20
 For this 
reason, we are unpersuaded by the City’s reliance on the 
Eighth Circuit’s 1984 Reeder decision—and its concern 
regarding quid pro quo corruption—to justify the Charter 
ban’s restriction on Appellants’ First Amendment rights. 
B 
As our preceding discussion demonstrates, we face a 
unique regulatory scheme forged from Philadelphia’s 
experience with political patronage, “at a different point in 
the development of campaign finance regulation.” 
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447 (reconsidering anew 
Buckley’s anticircumvention holding in light of current 
campaign finance decisions). The FOP Plaintiffs’ challenge 
against the Charter ban, as implemented by the current 
regulatory scheme, “thus merits our plenary consideration.” 
Id.  
The Supreme Court has expressed skepticism of 
political speech restrictions based on broad anticorruption 
rationales in recent campaign finance decisions. Last Term, in 
McCutcheon, it reiterated that Congress may take action only 
to address quid pro quo corruption and not “the appearance of 
mere influence or access.” Id. at 1451. This development, 
                                                 
20
 See, e.g., Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics 
Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2013); Long Beach 
Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 
684, 696 (9th Cir. 2010); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc); see 
also N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (pre-Citizens United). 
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coupled with the Court’s increased solicitude for the First 
Amendment rights of government workers, see, e.g., 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603–04 (1967), 
requires us to take care in determining that the Charter ban is 
closely tailored to the City’s aims. Contrary to the District 
Court, we find that the lack of fit between the City’s 
purported interests and the Charter ban renders the restriction 
an unacceptable response to the posited harms. 
The District Court held that the contribution ban was a 
reasonable regulation, as it was enacted to end the practice of 
compulsory political contributions that sustained 
Philadelphia’s political machine. Despite this conclusion, the 
City has failed, before both the District Court and this Court, 
to cite a single explanation as to how the contribution ban has 
directly mitigated its concerns. In fact, the record 
demonstrates the exact opposite: the 1919 Charter contained 
the same prohibition on political contributions by the police, 
but did nothing to undermine the patronage system. Even 
with the contribution ban in place, machine politics persisted, 
as the 1919 Charter’s perpetuation of a weak executive 
enabled the manipulation and circumvention of its edicts. For 
that reason, the District Court expressed uncertainty about the 
independent impact of the ban:  
It is impossible to determine the degree to 
which the contributions ban has reduced and 
continues to ward off endemic corruption in 
City Government and the [Philadelphia Police 
Department], although the likely answer is that 
Philadelphia’s era of machine politics ended as 
a result of the combined effect of several 
measures, including Civil Service reforms, laws 
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insulating government administration from 
political forces, as well as the challenged ban.  
Lodge No. 5, 2013 WL 638615, at *9 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, none of the City’s expert reports, which discuss the 
efficacy of the Home Rule Charter, attribute success to the 
contribution ban. Rather, they point to the Charter’s 
institution of a strong mayoral position—a reform made 
possible only by the concurrent dismantling of the Republican 
political machine—and the execution of comprehensive civil 
service regulations as the strongest reasons for reform. See 
Charter History at 3; Shore Report at 7. Thus, even if the 
Charter ban had effect at the time of its enactment—a fact 
belied by the record—the City now has in place a system of 
statutory safeguards that more directly address its concerns. 
In light of these more targeted measures, the Charter ban 
appears “particularly heavy-handed.” Cf. McCutcheon, 134 S. 
Ct. at 1446. 
The City also fails to persuade us why the contribution 
ban should apply only to the police, and not to the 
approximately 20,000 other individuals in its employ. The 
record shows that the Republican machine historically 
extracted political assessments from all civic employees: the 
practice was so pervasive that, in the early 20th century, the 
machine collected contributions from 94 percent of the city’s 
workforce. Shore Report at 2. If the Charter ban’s purpose 
was to end such compulsory wage contributions, it is unclear 
why the City would enforce the ban only against the police. 
Moreover, the City has made no attempt to show that the 
Democratic Party’s recent dominance in Philadelphia politics 
was achieved through corruption. 
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We understand that in certain circumstances, the City 
may distinguish police officers from other public employees 
because of their unique role in law enforcement. Cf. 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 n.5 (holding, in response to an 
equal protection challenge, that the government may single 
out certain classes of employees for restrictions on political 
expression). No other public role is “charged with the duty to 
protect life and property, prevent crime, and preserve the 
public peace and enforce the laws,” and the police are the 
only civic employees entrusted with the legitimate use of 
lethal force. Note, The Policeman: Must He Be A Second-
Class Citizen With Regard to His First Amendment Rights?, 
46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 536, 538 (1971) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). For this reason, we and other courts have allowed 
legislatures to regulate the police to a greater degree than 
other civic employees when the restriction serves a 
meaningful end. See, e.g., Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 
256, 261 (3d Cir. 2009) (prohibiting a policewoman from 
wearing a headscarf, as it would threaten the perception of 
neutrality); see also Kelley, 425 U.S. at 246; Reeder, 733 F.2d 
at 547; Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(finding that the need for internal discipline and paramilitary 
structure distinguishes policemen from other public servants). 
Here, however, the City’s concern that the police 
remain “above reproach,” A92, relates only to its general 
interest in the impartial and apolitical provision of its 
services—a concern that applies equally to all city employees. 
The four interests the City has advanced in this case—
unbiased law enforcement, merit-based advancement, 
employee protection, and departmental integrity—speak 
generally to the efficient operation of civic bureaucracy. 
Moreover, that the police are involved in public safety does 
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not salvage the City’s cause, as Philadelphia firefighters, who 
also discharge a critical public safety duty, are not subject to 
the Charter ban and can readily contribute to FIREPAC. 
Although the City expresses strong interests in this case, its 
general power to regulate political expression does not 
automatically trigger the “lesser included authority” to ban 
speech by certain groups; its “selectivity must itself pass 
constitutional muster.” Latino Officers Ass’n, 196 F.3d at 468 
(citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970)). 
Because the City does not enforce the Charter ban against the 
balance of its employees, it must explain why the ban has 
special significance against the police. We find that its 
invocation of historic police abuse—when the record shows 
that the contribution ban in fact aimed to dismantle political 
assessments levied against almost all of the city’s 
employees—is insufficient to justify the second-class 
treatment of the police. 
In lieu of a more precise explanation, the City focuses 
its appeal on an amorphous justification for the Charter ban, 
claiming that the ban is an integral part of a carefully 
calibrated, comprehensive scheme that insulates the police 
from “all political activity.” A265 (emphasis added). The 
City therefore contends that any change in this carefully 
designed scheme—for example, striking down the 
contribution ban—would lead to the parade of horribles 
detailed in its brief. 
The City’s argument in this respect is undermined 
thoroughly by the under-inclusiveness of the current scheme. 
As Regulation 8 makes clear, the police are hardly removed 
from politics. Officers, for instance, may engage in political 
expression so long as it is not coordinated with a partisan 
political group, and they may, among other activities, belong 
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to a political party, sign political petitions, and attend political 
events. They may also contribute time and money to 
nonpartisan political causes, including to organizations that 
advocate issues of concern to the police. See generally Bd. of 
Ethics Reg. No. 8. Given these exceptions, the contribution 
ban alone cannot insulate officers from having to curry 
political favor with superiors who might demand that they do 
so: although individual officers cannot contribute funds, they 
can provide many other resources to advance their superiors’ 
preferred political causes. The premise of the City’s 
justification, then, is false. Because police officers are 
engaged in politics, the City cannot rest on the vague and 
inaccurate notion of insulating them from “all political 
activity” to justify the Charter ban. NTEU demands a more 
concrete and credible connection between means and ends. 
Philadelphia’s scheme also draws an arbitrary 
distinction between associations of employees, who are not 
subject to the Charter restrictions, and individuals. As the 
District Court found, police officers may join groups and 
associations that advance their political agendas. Some of 
those groups, including FOP, endorse candidates for local 
elections and contribute to their political campaigns. FOP also 
holds fundraisers for these candidates, at which they hand out 
“courtesy cards” to large donors—practices also permitted 
under the regulations. These concerted acts, more than the 
activities of any individual officer, implicate the City’s 
interests in ensuring the impartial enforcement of the law and 
in maintaining the public’s perception of police integrity. But 
the City has not explained why it permits the police union (a 
group perceived to be the collective voice of the police) to 
engage in such expressive activities, while it precludes 
individual police officers (whose involvement is not 
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necessarily representative) from doing the same. The current 
scheme, therefore, fails to regulate a substantial part of the 
activity that gives rise to the alleged harms. Cf. Florida Star 
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (professing “serious 
doubts about whether [the government] is, in fact, serving . . . 
the significant interests which [it] invoke[d]” where the 
statute was under-inclusive); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 
443 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1979) (striking down a statute that 
prohibited the distribution of juvenile defendants’ names 
because the law did not regulate similar dissemination via 
electronic media). 
Our analysis is informed by the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
in Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency, 56 F.3d 85 
(D.C. Cir. 1995), which held that an under-inclusive 
regulation could not survive under NTEU even though the 
government had presented a real interest. In that case, agency 
employees challenged a regulation that prohibited expense 
reimbursement from private sources only for “non-official 
appearances”; employees could be reimbursed if their 
appearance was approved by the agency. 56 F.3d at 88. The 
D.C. Circuit found that this dichotomy between “official” and 
“non-official” events undermined the agency’s rationale, as 
the agency’s interest—to curtail the “threat to the integrity of 
the government occasioned by employees using their public 
office for private gain”—was implicated whether employees’ 
business was official or not. Id. at 94–95. First, an employee 
would receive the same private benefit “whether the agency 
‘approve[d]’ [the reimbursement] or not”; second, officially 
sanctioned benefits “create[d] a greater appearance that 
government employment systematically translates into social 
advantage than would the unsanctioned perks of individual 
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bureaucrats.” Id. at 95–96. Thus, the regulation, at least based 
on the agency’s articulated interest, could not stand.  
Likewise, here FOP’s involvement in politics raises 
the specter of three of the City’s four stated harms: ensuring 
that the police enforce the law without bias or favoritism; 
protecting subordinate employees from currying the political 
favor of their superiors; and maintaining the efficiency and 
quality, both actual and perceived, of the services provided by 
the police force. As the strongest proof that the “politicization 
of the police” remains a threat, City Br. at 51, the City 
pointed not to instances of individual officer misconduct, but 
to FOP’s practice of handing out courtesy cards and its 
endorsement and financing of local candidates. Because the 
Charter ban applies only to individual officers, it serves no 
appreciable function in curbing these purportedly harmful 
practices. Furthermore, because FOP’s actions are permitted, 
the ban impedes the strength of its lawful message by 
preventing COPPAC from collecting sufficient funds from 
willing union members. This is a strange dichotomy: allowing 
FOP to participate directly in partisan political campaigns, 
while preventing officers from contributing to a political 
action committee unaffiliated with any political candidate. 
Regardless of whether more comprehensive 
restrictions on FOP and officers would be permissible—a 
question we need not determine here—the City’s inconsistent 
treatment of the union and its members fatally erodes its 
justifications for the Charter ban. In this respect, the ban 
operates differently than those considered by the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits. The contribution ban upheld by the Fifth 
Circuit in Wachsman was part of a larger scheme that 
restricted almost all of city employees’ political expression, 
either in individual or in collective form. There, the city not 
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only prohibited its employees from contributing to 
campaigns, but also mandated that “[n]o employee of the city 
or association of such employees may publicly endorse or 
actively support candidates.” 704 F.2d at 162 (quoting City 
Charter of the City of Dallas § 16(b)(1)) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pollard—which was adopted in its entirety by the Eighth 
Circuit in Reeder—reasoned that the state’s ban on political 
donations represented the legislature’s determination that a 
contribution’s “public demonstration of support” was one “a 
police officer should not make.” Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 341. 
Here, the City is of two minds: Regulation 8 expressly 
permits a police officer to make public demonstrations of 
support, either through his union or on his own time, while 
prohibiting him from providing financial support. It is hard to 
fathom how the latter is a more pernicious form of expression 
than the former. Cf. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (finding that 
“[i]mposing a greater burden on speech than on other off-duty 
activities assumed to pose the same threat to the efficiency of 
the federal service is, at best, anomalous”). And while the 
contribution ban may be directed generally at the problem of 
money in politics, that rationale cannot save the day, for the 
City has not relied upon it in this case. See Sanjour, 56 F.3d 
at 96 (“The Pickering/NTEU question . . . is not whether 
some conceivable ‘governmental’ interest might be 
constitutionally advanced by the regulations; . . . we must 
limit our inquiry to the ‘interests the State itself asserts.’”) 
(quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993)). 
Based on the foregoing, only the City’s third rationale 
for the ban—protecting officers from politically motivated 
practices—has force. The City contends that officers may be 
subject to subtle pressures to contribute to COPPAC, and thus 
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“an officer [may] make[] a contribution based on a desire to 
please or avoid the displeasure of superior officers.” A290–
91; see also City Br. at 51–52. As discussed earlier, FOP 
intends to encourage new recruits to consent to have funds 
automatically deducted from their paychecks and sent to 
COPPAC, raising the concern that officers would be forced to 
donate out of professional obligation instead of personal 
belief. If contributing to COPPAC becomes a mark of an 
officer’s merit, it is possible that these donations could lead to 
the City’s concern of politically motivated hiring and 
advancement. See Wachsman, 704 F.2d at 175 (finding that 
the contribution ban was “reasonably necessary” to protect 
employees from “undue employee influence”). While the 
FOP Plaintiffs insist that the ban is restrictive and not 
protective, the City’s legitimate goal of shielding employees 
may extend to “employees who do not wish to be protected.” 
Id. 
In our view, the City’s concern is not so much a 
function of an officer’s ability to make contributions; rather, 
it is a consequence of the method by which FOP seeks to 
extract such donations. The FOP Plaintiffs brought this suit to 
compel the City to implement City Bill No. 060181, a payroll 
deduction procedure that would enable the union (and 
potentially an officer’s superiors, who are members of the 
union) to facilitate officers’ recruitment as COPPAC donors. 
We understand why FOP would desire an automatic payroll 
deduction insofar as it stands to reason that its inherently 
coercive nature would probably maximize the amount of 
funds it could raise. Cf. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 
U.S. 353, 355 (2009) (recognizing that “unions face 
substantial difficulties in collecting funds for political speech 
without using payroll deductions”). But if the City truly cares 
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about insulating its police from such subtle pressures, the 
solution is within its power: it could repeal City Bill No. 
060181. See id. (“The First Amendment . . . does not confer 
an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms 
for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.”). 
Furthermore, the City could enforce a more direct restriction 
in Regulation 8, which prohibits employees from soliciting 
contributions at the workplace. 
The Supreme Court recently stated in McCutcheon that 
a contribution restriction is not “closely drawn” if there are 
more targeted alternatives that would serve the government’s 
interests. 134 S. Ct. at 1458. There, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a provision in the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which capped the total amount 
an individual could donate to political candidates and to 
political action committees.
21
 Id. at 1442. The government 
argued that the aggregate cap was necessary to prevent the 
circumvention of contribution caps to individual candidates. 
Id. The Court found that the aggregate cap was not adequately 
tailored, given the existence of more targeted means to 
accomplish the same objective. Id. at 1458. It placed 
particular emphasis on three anticircumvention alternatives. 
First, it found that restrictions on transfers between candidates 
and political committees would more directly address 
Congress’s concern about circumvention without the 
“unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights. Id. 
                                                 
21
 BCRA imposed two separate limits on campaign 
contributions. Base limits restricted the amount a donor could 
contribute to a particular candidate or committee. Aggregate 
limits, in turn, restricted how much a donor could give in total 
to all candidates or committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a.  
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Second, tighter earmarking rules would accomplish the same 
goal. Id. at 1458–59. And finally, the Court found that, in the 
Internet age, disclosure of the identities of campaign donors 
provided robust protections against corruption. Id. at 1459–
60. Likewise here, the possibility of multiple solutions for the 
City’s stated concerns—for example, the prohibition of 
automatic paycheck deductions, or greater enforcement of 
existing anti-solicitation measures—bolster our conclusion 
that the Charter’s ban on contributions to a political action 
committee is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
In sum, the City has not demonstrated that the Charter 
ban as applied in this case is “closely drawn” to its interests, 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, such that it addresses those interests 
in a “direct and material way.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475. 
Several features of the current scheme demonstrate that the 
City has not met these criteria. The ban prevents police 
officers from donating to a political action committee 
unaffiliated with any political candidate, an act that the 
Supreme Court has stated does not implicate concerns of quid 
pro quo corruption. Nor has the City shown how the ban has 
any causal impact on its stated harms, and the ban is 
illogically under-inclusive, permitting many of the harms that 
the City purportedly seeks to address. These features, 
especially given the availability of less restrictive alternatives, 
compel us to invalidate the Charter ban. 
* * * 
We are loath to disturb a component of the Home Rule 
Charter’s legislative scheme, particularly in light of 
Philadelphia’s historic struggles with police and political 
corruption and the Charter’s centrality to the City’s efforts to 
foster good government. The City has satisfied its burden 
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under NTEU that it has veritable interests in maintaining the 
integrity and impartiality of its police force, in promoting 
merit-based hiring and advancement, in insulating officers 
from political pressure, and in ensuring the efficiency and 
quality of police services. 
But as the NTEU Court reiterated: “Fear of serious 
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and 
assembly. . . . To justify suppression of free speech there must 
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free 
speech is practiced.” NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475 (quoting 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). Despite its valid concerns, the City has not 
explained how the Charter ban serves in a direct and material 
way to address these harms. Most troubling, the City claims 
that the ban is part and parcel of a larger scheme that insulates 
police officers from all politics, while simultaneously 
condoning political activities by the police that have similar, 
if not more pernicious, implications. Given the lack of fit 
between the City’s stated objectives and the means selected to 
achieve it, we hold the Charter ban unconstitutional. 
We will reverse the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to the City and remand the case for 
judgment to be entered in favor of the Appellants. 
